Pakistan's Political Crisis: America's Policy Options
Published: November 23, 2007
Originally appeared as an op-ed in Indian Express
President Pervez Musharraf’s imposition of a state of emergency on November 3 was
incredibly shortsighted. To be sure, at some point he would have had to
relinquish power, and the move staved off that inevitability for the
present and immediate future. Yet, prior to the emergency rule, Musharraf might have had some
chance to retain his position for another five years, possibly under a
power-sharing agreement with Benazir Bhutto, or some other alternative.
Now there is no scenario under which Musharraf would enjoy legitimacy, either
in the eyes of Pakistan’s civil society or the international community.
Perhaps even more damning for Musharraf’s prospects for retention of power—regardless of questions about domestic constitutional legitimacy or international acceptance—is the fact
that surely he is close to exhausting the respect, trust and patience
of Pakistan’s military. His diminished standing would not come merely
as a result of his political blunders, but due to the army’s
performance. From the ill-fated Kargil escapade in 1999, which
Musharraf led, to the recent humiliations in Swat, Pakistan's army has not
exactly experienced unqualified success with Musharraf as chief of
staff. Its morale is low and will continue to erode as long as Pakistani troops
are asked to train their guns on Muslims within their own borders.
The US should therefore go beyond its current stance of simply
denouncing Musharraf’s actions in limp terms. Urging him to lift the
state of emergency, remove his army uniform and press forward with
parliamentary elections is not enough. The elections are destined to be
a sham under a caretaker government whose neutrality will clearly be compromised.
Instead, the Bush administration should publicly urge Musharraf
to resign from his position as president. Moreover, it should call for
the reinstatement of the dismissed Supreme Court justices and the
release of the thousands of opposition party supporters, attorneys, and human rights activists apparently still under detention. Such steps would begin to
reverse the current conditions in Pakistan that are a stark
contradiction of the rule of law and democratic processes.
One option on the table for forcing Musharraf’s hand—cutting
of aid—is at this point likely to be counterproductive. The US should,
however, review its aid practices to Pakistan generally. It should
consider reducing military assistance, while increasing funding for
endeavours such as education that would more directly better the
lives of Pakistan’s people and the country’s democratic institutions.
With extremism gaining momentum in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province, it might seem that this is a
dangerous proposition in the short term. But in the long run, such aid
would serve both Pakistan’s and America’s interests more effectively.
The poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz famously wrote of the day when thrones would be toppled and crowns would be tossed. While
Faiz’s elevation of Pakistan’s people to a higher platform may still be
a distant vision, it appears that the fall of Musharraf is only a
matter of time. We shall see.