US Must Engage, Not Isolate, Iran
Published: September 13, 2008
Originally appeared as an op-ed in Peoria Journal Star
Why, for almost 30 years, has the U.S. failed to engage Iran when it
plays a central role in establishing a peaceful and stable security
order in the Middle East?
The simple answer—clearly articulated in the vitriolic rhetoric from American politicians—is that the U.S. despises Iran.
Unfortunately, this attitude is a relic of the Cold War era, when
strategies such as containment and isolation seemed to be effective in
controlling revisionist states. Today, these same strategies seem to
have little effect. Indeed, American efforts to cast Iran as an
international pariah have failed.
Considering three decades of failure, continuing on the same path
appears futile, stubborn and incompetent. This is particularly true if
one considers the ever increasing importance of Middle East stability
in winning the wars in Iraq and on terror. If there is to be any chance
of success, change in U.S. foreign policy is needed.
In short, it is time for the U.S. to take on the diplomatic challenge that is Iran
Why is Iran a diplomatic challenge? Because diplomacy represents the
only viable path to realizing any shift in Iranian foreign policy. I
use diplomacy here in a broad sense, representing a political tool kit
that includes direct engagement and mutual recognition of each others’
concerns, along with their legitimacy.
At present, both sides have failed to do this in any meaningful way,
calling out the other for aggressive behavior. For the U.S., this
includes Iranian support for Shiia militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in
Lebanon, and bellicose rhetoric toward Israel.
For Iran, it is U.S.-supported efforts at regime change within its
borders, military encirclement and a double standard with respect to
Israel and its neighbors.
Diplomacy, meanwhile, also should include implementation of other
resources, short of military force, to encourage greater cooperation.
For the United States, this could include adopting a less threatening
military posture. It could include providing incentives for cooperation
in Iraq, the war on terrorism and in the non-proliferation arena. All
too often, the U.S. has resorted to threats of retaliation for failure
to cooperate, which has tended to exacerbate these issues.
For Iran, recognition of U.S. national security interests in Iraq and
the Middle East is paramount, in addition to understanding the
consequences of instability created by the support of violent groups
outside its borders. Such issues can be addressed only through
diplomacy, not hollow threats regarding the use of force (i.e., saying
that “all options are on the table.”).
Talking for sake of talking is not likely to change very much, however.
There must be determination on both sides—and the international
community—to hold each accountable for their commitments. There also
must be time allotted for change, as neither the U.S. nor Iran can
re-orient its foreign policy overnight.
Indeed, for the U.S., direct talks are essential for success for at
least two reasons. First, working through other countries has been
rather ineffective, as most do not view the Iranian regime in the same
way, limiting their resolve to pursue change. Second, working through
other countries treats Iran as a minor power in a subservient role to
the U.S.
The reality, however, is that Iran is a regional power that must be
treated as such if it is expected to consider cooperation with the U.S.
a foreign policy priority. A failure to use direct diplomacy only
strengthens the resolve of the Iranian leadership to counter U.S. power
and influence in the region.
The arguments for not engaging Iran are weak. It is a government, U.S.
policymakers argue, that is despotic, supports terrorism, and seeks to
destabilize the Middle East. Thus, the Iranian regime stands against
everything the U.S. believes to be important to the future of the
Middle East. Any acknowledgment of the regime only affords it
legitimacy, while undermining U.S. efforts at security and
democratization in the region.
Taking these concerns into account, one must still consider whether the
long-standing U.S. policies that have sought to isolate and belittle
Iran have done anything to alter Iran’s trajectory. Given that Iran is
moving to acquire nuclear capabilities, it appears these policies have
made things worse. In fact, both Gulf Wars have arguably strengthened
Iran’s regional power aspirations.
What Iran does with this newfound power is still open to influence but
only if the United States chooses engagement. The Iranian regime does
not appear to be short-lived. Like it or not, the only possibility for
the U.S. short of war is to pursue direct diplomacy with Iran.
After 30 years of isolation and ignorance, there no longer is time to
wait if the U.S. wants to achieve success in Iraq and the global war on
terror, in addition to pursuing a comprehensive Middle East peace.
The U.S. must choose engagement if there is to be any chance of
altering the behavior of Iran in a way that is more consistent with
U.S. goals. There seems little to lose but much to gain by doing so.
Derrick Frazier is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois. He may be reached at dvfrazie[at]illinois[dot]edu.