Effect of Current and Future Nuclear Navies on an International Agreement over the Limiting of Fissile Materials Production
Last updated: October 20, 2008
Author
Published by Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois
ACDIS Research Report series
September 2007
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Summary
The most effective way to prevent the development of new nuclear weapons is to prevent the production of fissile materials. However, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States each have naval vessels that are fueled with fissile material. Furthermore, Brazil and India are developing such vessels. It has been argued that a formal cutoff of fissile material production, namely that of highly enriched uranium (HEU), will prevent nuclear navies from being fueled. The reality of the situation is calculated in this work.rnIt is shown that each current nuclear navy can be fueled for at least 100 years using its country’s existing stockpile of HEU. For instance, the United States can fuel its navy for over 500 years. Obviously, a formal cutoff will not hinder the ability of any existing navy, but it may not be amenable to nations that are in the process of developing nuclear navies. To deal with this issue, a production cutoff above 40% HEU is proposed. It is shown that such an enrichment level can still provide adequate power to nuclear vessels, while being essentially useless for a military nuclear weapons program.
With these numbers in hand, a model is developed that determines how likely India and Pakistan, both of which are currently outside many proliferation agreements, can come to an agreement limiting the production of fissile material depending on political pressure put on them by various other key countries. It shows that although an agreement in the short term is unlikely, one is likely to be reached within 25 years. This, along with the previous calculations, indicates that the countries of the world stand to benefit more strategically by agreeing to a formal fissile material production cutoff than not.
