End of Nuclear Testing
Last updated: October 20, 2008
Author
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Jeremiah D. Sullivan |
Published by Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois
ACDIS Research Report series
March 1996
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Note: Published in “Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the German Physical Society, Jena DGR, Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschraft,” Naturwissenschaftliche Beitrage zu Abrustung und Verfikation, J. Altman and G. Neuneck editors, (1996).Nuclear weapon testing was the icon of the Cold War and of the nuclear arms race it spawned. Throughout most of the Cold War, the nuclear weapon states were on public record as favoring a cessation of all nuclear weapon testing but their actions were rarely, if ever, consistent with that position. Today in 1996, the prospects for achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)—a treaty ending all nuclear testing—have never been greater. In the past year, major policy decisions taken in France, the United States, and the United Kingdom have removed obstacles that earlier appeared insurmountable in achieving a true CTBT. The situation today is far less clear in Russia and China, and it is by no means guaranteed that the signing of a CTBT will be accomplished by the close of 1996, as the five declared nuclear weapon states have pledged. Nevertheless, a tide is flowing; governments and citizens around the world seem to concur that the time has come to end all nuclear testing.
The purpose of this report is not to talk about the “end game” of the CTBT negotiation process, but rather to summarize the conclusions of a Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored study that provided the technical basis of a new policy concerning the scope of a CTBT announced by President Clinton on August 11, 1995. In his press conference that day, the President declared that the United States was ready to enter into a true-zero yield nuclear test ban. In this report, the author draws from his participation last summer in that DOE study together with the knowledge and experience he has gained from two decades of work as an academic and as a consultant to the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on arms control and defense technologies.