Theater Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty: Either-Or?
Last updated: November 5, 2008
Author
Published by Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
ACDIS Occasional Paper series
February 1995
Full text [PDF]Summary
As a result of the Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its emphasis on theater missile defenses (TMD) with the goal of building more capable TMD systems to counter threats the United States is likely to face in future theater wars. In support of this aim, the United States began discussions with Russia regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. The purpose of these discussions is to clarify the boundary between strategic missile defenses, which are limited by the treaty, and tactical and theater ballistic missile defenses, which are not limited by the treaty.Will this effort to clarify the ABM Treaty undermine the purpose of the treaty? Exactly what capabilities does the United States need for theater missile defense? Does the ABM Treaty still serve a purpose or is it outdated? Can we have both TMD and the ABM Treaty? To what extent should the United States engage in cooperative TMD efforts with allies, Russia, or other states?
To answer these questions I will first review the historical factors that brought us the ABM Treaty as well as the purpose and results of the treaty. This discussion will also summarize several significant events that have occurred since the treaty was ratified in 1972. The purpose of this review is to place the treaty in proper context and to establish a base for an analysis of current negotiations in the light of past events. Since the current treaty negotiations concern the demarcation between the strategic defenses the treaty was designed to limit and others that are permitted, I will begin by reviewing the reasons for and purpose of the ABM Treaty. Without this understanding we might find ourselves undoing the past without wanting to do so.