Upcoming Seminars

Radioactive Material Security: Threat, Consequences, and Mitigation

Abstract:

In 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency convened a meeting in Dijon, France, to start a discussion on the proper handling and protection of high-activity radioactive sources. The onus for this was that in the previous decade there had been several consequential accidents resulting in widespread contamination and deterministic effects to humans including death. Since that time, Sandia National Laboratories has conducted many studies on the use of radioactive sources and the associated risk. This presentation is a summary of the vast work that has been performed that includes analysis of the threat and consequences of dispersion of material, principles of protection of material, and replacement of sources with safer technologies. 

Bio:

As a Systems Analyst at Sandia National Laboratories, Dr. Gus Potter provides technical analysis to U.S. government agencies by conducting end-to-end systems studies and providing expertise in the radiological and nuclear threat and security areas. He has led studies on radiological and nuclear detection architecture, adversarial threat and risk, radiological consequences, and material properties and risk, which have influenced national policy on the protection of source material and detection strategies. He has also briefed U.S. Congressional subcommittees on the radiological and nuclear threat and participated in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) working groups to devise new international security standards. In his previous work, Dr. Potter was responsible for both internal and external radiation dosimetry, including interpretation of radiobioassay models and measurements and implementation of thermoluminescent dosimetry technologies.

Dr. Potter also serves as an adjunct professor in the Nuclear Engineering Department at the University of New Mexico. He is active in the Health Physics Society and the American Academy of Health Physics (as Past President). He previously served as Chair, Board Member, and Exam Panel Chair of the American Board of Health Physics. Dr. Potter participates in standards activities as Vice Chair of the ANSI/HPS Accredited Standards Committee N13 and on three working groups of the International Organization for Standardization. He serves as an associate editor and regular reviewer for Health Physics and as a regular reviewer for Radiation Protection Dosimetry; he has written or contributed to over sixty technical reports and articles for various publications.

In 2000, Dr. Potter earned his Ph.D. in physics at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, where he studied applications of internal radiation dosimetry models promulgated by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. He is a Distinguished member of the American Board of Health Physics (certified in 1997) and a Fellow of the Health Physics Society. He is the 2017 awardee of the William McAdams Outstanding Service Award from the American Board of Health Physics and the 2021 awardee of the Joyce B. Davis Memorial Award from the American Academy of Health Physics. 

Zoom  Meeting ID: 834 4025 8346  Passcode: 188111

Building a Scientific Foundation for Security

Abstract:

To help incorporate security into future systems engineering visions, a paradigmatic shift is endorsed to reframe systems security as trustworthy, loss-driven, and capabilities-based. Similar research from Sandia National Laboratories has explored cutting-edge approaches to systems security for national security applications. Together, these efforts highlight the need for—and a path toward—a scientific foundation for security.

Leveraging underlying tenets of systems theory, observed security heuristics, and emerging concepts helps triangulate a set of “first principles” as part of a scientific foundation for security as an emergent systems property. This foundation incorporates traditional physical security designs, cyber security architectures, and personnel security programs, as well as the often-ignored interactions between them. These first principles serve as the basis for a set of derived systems security performance axioms that support ongoing efforts in the field.

This approach's logic and designability have been demonstrated through a multilayer network model-based approach for systems security. The structure of this scientific foundation for security offers additional, innovative opportunities to achieve desired levels of trustworthiness, creative mechanisms to meet needs, innovative loss-driven approaches, and enhanced capabilities—all aimed at producing more efficient and effective systems security solutions against current and emerging threats, uncertainties, and complexities.

Bio:

Sue Caskey is a distinguished member of the technical staff, research and systems analyst at Sandia National Laboratories. One of the founding members of Sandia's Global Chemical and Biological Security program, she has nearly 30 years of international security expertise and has supported work in more than 30 countries. Sue is currently the lead for analytical projects on global threat prioritization and risk assessment across the entire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) domain—including dual-use equipment, the team lead for Southern Asian CMC activities, and the scientific advisor to AI driven non-proliferation endeavors. In direct support of U.S. DoS, DOE, and DOD cooperative threat reduction efforts, this work involves developing unique models and tools to characterize current and emerging global threats. Sue is also working on various technical threat reduction efforts with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the World Health Organization. As part of her activities at Sandia National Laboratories, Sue has created an ad hoc working group to better support global analysis and data governance, focusing on cross-domain global threats.

For domestic and international partners, Sue conducts agent-based analysis, safety, and security assessments. In this domain, she has designed and tested the implementation of engineering controls, physical security systems, cyber security systems, and personal reliability programs at facilities around the globe. She has also designed and implemented network-based, disease surveillance systems for humans and animals; and designed and developed the model and software for the BioRAM and Chem-SAM tools—both recommended by the U.S. DHS and Centers for Disease Control and the World Health Organization.

With B.A. degrees in Biology and Computer Science from the University of New Mexico and an M.E. in Systems Engineering from Old Dominion University (ODU), Sue is currently working toward her Ph.D. in Systems Engineering (from ODU) with a specific interest in complex systems, risk, and decision analysis. As part of her academic interests, she has also become active in IEEE and INCOSE and continues to be a member of the Society of Risk Analysis.

Zoom  Meeting ID: 834 4025 8346  Passcode: 188111

Dr. Castiglioni has 15 years of experience providing technical advisory services to the US Government on chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation issues, including the development, implementation, and enforcement of export controls. This includes supporting the Department of Energy's participation in the US Delegation to the Australia Group, participating in Department of Energy's stautory role in the review of license applications for exports of dual-use commodities, and serving as SME instructor, curriculum developer, and country lead for export control capacity building engagements led by Department of Energy with over 15 foreign partners. He also works with Department of State and Department of Homeland Security on projects involving chemical and biological WMD counterproliferation. He earned a B.S. in Biochemistry from Tufts University and a PhD in Biology from Brown University.

Unfortunately, Camila will be unable to visit campus at this time!! Stay tuned to see if we can get her rescheduled for later in the semester! 

Abstract: 

Housed at Argonne National Laboratory, IAEA Programs works with the Department of State to serve as an interface between the IAEA and the US nuclear community, promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, and supporting nuclear safety and security. Every year, the United States government sponsors US citizens to work for the IAEA as Cost-Free Experts, Junior Professional Officers, and Interns. IAEA Programs coordinates these sponsorships for the IAEA's non-Safeguards departments and Offices Reporting to the Director General. The IAEA Careers Program encourages well-qualified Americans to join the IAEA's professional staff in non-Safeguards departments and assists interested US candidates in applying to open positions.

Bio: 

Camila Martinica is an IAEA Programs Assistant at Argonne National Laboratory and leads the U.S. Funded internship program. Camila graduated from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign with a BA in Global Studies and a minor in Arabic. She is interested in the intersection between environment, sustainability, and social responsibility and is passionate about the impact of nuclear technologies in developing countries.

Abstract:

The conventional wisdom in international politics holds that credibility — or the perceived likelihood that an actor will follow through on their commitments — is a quality that policymakers universally crave because it confers both status and material benefits which enhance one’s bargaining abilities. Indeed, according to major theories of crisis bargaining, credibility is one of the few qualities that is worth fighting for. Yet the conventional wisdom overlooks a central reality: decision-makers from different foreign policy bureaucracies do not share a common definition of either credibility or the circumstances under which credibility is worth sacrificing blood and treasure. In fact, American officials were sometimes aligned, but often divided over this question during major 20th century crises over Berlin, Taiwan, the Suez Canal, and the Balkans. 

The Bureaucratic Battlefield: Credibility and Crisis Decision-Making argues that diplomatic and military organizations understand credibility differently and thus may reach different conclusions about the wisdom of using force when their country is on the brink of war. Combining a general theoretical argument with quantitative, qualitative, and survey evidence, this book breaks open the black box of the state by revealing how bureaucracy moderates when decision-makers’ credibility concerns push them toward costly conflict. In doing so, it offers fresh perspective on why civilian rather than military officials are sometimes the most hawkish voices in the room, with major implications for theories of crisis bargaining.

This Seminar Series will be held in Coble Hall #306 (801 S. Wright St.) and via Zoom

Abstract:

This seminar will explore current key trends and insights shaping the future of nuclear energy policy and deployment both in the U.S. and globally. The speaker will present a potential vision for a future in which nuclear power enables net zero emissions by 2050. The narrow path required to turn this vision into reality is not only imperiled by the potential for a softening of national and global climate goals, but it is also challenged by a need to balance nuclear security with deployment. Key elements needed to realize this vision include mobilizing bold private capital investments, scaling a skilled workforce, revitalizing critical supply chains, engaging the public, and embedding safeguards and security into nuclear reactor and facility designs from the outset. As this future approaches, numerous opportunities and challenges will arise, inviting urgent research. The speaker will outline key areas of research needed to accelerate reactor deployment, secure and sustain the front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle, and ensure computational nuclear analysis tools are fully prepared to harness the power of the world's fastest computers. 

Bio:

The Honorable Kathryn D. Huff, PhD, is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Nuclear, Plasma, and Radiological Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. From May 2021 to May 2024, she took a leave of absence from UIUC to hold multiple positions in the U.S. Department of Energy, including that of Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy. Before joining UIUC, she was a Postdoctoral Fellow with both the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium and the Berkeley Institute for Data Science at the University of California - Berkeley. As a PhD student, she helped to reimagine the GENIUSv2 fuel cycle simulator and became the primary developer of the Cyclus simulator in its initial phase. In addition, she collaborated with the Systems Analysis group at Idaho National Laboratory to develop the Fuel Cycle Simulator Software Requirements that defined the goals and expectations for the Next Generation Fuel Cycle Simulator. She received her PhD in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in August 2013 as a student of Professor Paul P.H. Wilson. Her undergraduate degree was in Physics from the University of Chicago. Her PhD dissertation and postdoctoral work both focused on development of software for nuclear engineering applications such as the Cyclus simulator, PyNE, and extensions to MOOSE. She is particularly interested in robust modeling and simulation of advanced reactors emphasizing scientific software engineering best practices.

Zoom   Meeting ID: 834 4025 8346   Password: 188111

Abstract:

Biology is becoming increasingly “programmable” as advances in genetic engineering and AI revolutionize our ability to read, write, and manipulate genetic material. This talk will explore the accelerating field of synthetic biology and the corresponding rise in biosecurity challenges and opportunities. We will examine how new technologies—while promising breakthroughs in medicine, energy, and agriculture—also introduce novel risks, such as the potential engineering of pandemic-capable pathogens. Drawing on current events and real-world case studies, the presentation will outline why building robust biosecurity policies is paramount to navigating this new era, both to guard against deliberate misuse and to mitigate laboratory accidents. We will consider key questions facing scientists and policymakers: How do we harness technological innovation responsibly, and which frameworks best ensure safety without stifling discovery? Ultimately, this session highlights the urgency of building a global biosecurity ecosystem that can respond to emerging threats while equitably unlocking the benefits of biotechnology. Attendees will gain insights into the technical, ethical, and policy dimensions of biosecurity, with ample discussion on how students and researchers from diverse fields—including engineering, political science, and public health—can shape solutions for a safer, more resilient future.

Bio:

Matt leads Biosecurity at Ginkgo Bioworks (NYSE:DNA). Biosecurity is Ginkgo's business unit focused on national security and global pandemic response. Prior to building the Biosecurity business, Matt spent 4 years as Ginkgo’s Chief Commercial Officer and 7 years as an investor at IndUS Growth Partners where he was also the President and COO of Decision Resources Group. Matt has worked supporting business development at Palantir Technologies and is an active venture investor. Early in his career, he served as an officer in the United States Marine Corps. Matt completed a degree in History at Dartmouth College and is a graduate of the joint degree program at the Harvard Business School and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government where he was a Zuckerman Fellow.

Zoom   Meeting ID: 834 4025 8346   Password: 188111

Washington Post Op-ed he co-wrote with Dr. Ashish Jha and Matt Pottinger: 

ZOOM EVENT ONLY! Join us by clicking HERE! 

Introduction to Physical Security:

Sandia National Laboratories developed and refined the Design Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) to provide a systems engineering method for protecting nuclear reactors and facilities. This lecture draws upon the comprehensive training provided by Sandia to various countries as part of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) international training course. While safety measures are essential for preventing accidents and safeguards are crucial for thwarting proliferation, security plays a pivotal role in mitigating malicious actions from both insider and outsider threats. Attendees will gain valuable insights into the diverse scientific disciplines that contribute to physical protection strategies, as well as an understanding of how domestic and global security policies are enforced to protect some of our most vital assets. Through this discussion, we aim to illuminate the multifaceted approach required to ensure the security of existing and emerging nuclear technologies in an increasingly complex world.

Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Abstract:

Dr. Amanda Hurley will outline her experience at the intersection of Science Policy, Science Diplomacy, and Biosecurity.

Bio:

Dr. Amanda Hurley supports the Division of International Affairs at the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H), which funds transformative and translation health research. Dr. Hurley is a subject matter expert on global public health supply chains and equitable access to medical countermeasures. Prior to ARPA-H, Amanda was a Foreign Affairs Officer and completed a Science and Technology Policy Fellowship with AAAS at the U.S. Department of State in the Office of Global Health Security. She was privileged to represent the U.S. government on 14 trips to 11 countries on five continents in less than three years at the State Department.

Dr. Hurley completed a USDA postdoctoral fellowship with Dr. Jo Handelsman at the University of Wisconsin – Madison in 2021. She has a Ph.D. in Molecular Biology from Princeton University, B.S. in Microbiology from the University of New Hampshire and spent over a decade in research studying HIV, cholera, and the small molecule manipulation of bacterial behavior.

Zoom  Meeting ID: 834 4025 8346   Password: 188111